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Abstract 
 
Research on subnational capital markets in developing nations has tended to focus on 
designing regulatory frameworks that compensate for structural economic, fiscal, and 
political factors. However, research on public investment in the US shows that functio nal 
factors, like administrative capacity and metropolitan cooperation, are also important. 
Using a panel dataset of Mexican municipal debt (2005-2012), the study examines whether 
metropolitan cooperation and administrative capacity affect subnational debt decisions in 
this developing nation. Cross-sectional time-series analysis of different types of municipal 
debt (public development bank loans and private commercial bank debt, bond emissions, 
and trust instruments) reveals that municipalities in metropolitan areas avoid costlier credits 
but that they do not cooperate to access cheaper credits. It also reveals that administrative 
capacity plays little to no role in municipal debt decisions. 
 
 1 
Introduction 
Scholars regularly argue that subnational capital markets in developing nations can 
improve the provision of public services that contribute to social welfare and economic 
development (Cernuschi and Platz 2006; Martell and Guess 2006; Leigland 1997, Oates 
2005, Weingast 2009). However, the efficient operation of subnational capital markets in 
facilitating public investment is complicated by well-known structural economic, fiscal, and 
political factors that result in policy inefficiency and excess spending. National economic 
and business cycles raise the incentive of subnational governments to engage in cyclical 
public spending sprees (Freire and Petersen 2004, Dillinger and Webb 1999). Vertical fiscal 
imbalances and soft budget constraints lead them toward inefficient policy choices and 
public spending (Rodden 2006). Election cycles, divided government, and vertical partisan 
juxtaposition aggravate these tendencies (Drazen and Eslava 2010, Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho 2008, Veiga and Veiga 2007, Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi 2012, Sáez 2016, Letelier 
S. 2011, Rodden and Wibbels 2002, Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tomassi 1999). The 
consequences of inefficient subnational policy-making, often called ³T\pe II  ´ problems 
(Musacchio and Pinea 2014), are well known: overly indebted subnational governments that 
can require debt restructuring or wholesale bailouts, undermining national fiscal finances 
and macroeconomic stability (Amieva-Huerta 1997, Rubin 1993, Ter-Minassian 1997, 
Rodden and Wibbels 2002, Rodden 2006).  
Because the structural factors leading to ³T\pe II  ´ problems are often difficult to 
change (Musacchio and Pinea 2015), scholars debate the best functional frameworks for 
improving oversight over subnational policy choices (the lack of which is often called a 
³T\pe I  ´problem). Scholars debate the optimal functional frameworks for managing the 
budgetary processes, administrative rules, and regulatory environments shaping subnational 
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public investment (Miller and Hildreth 2002, Johnson 1996, Kelemen and Teo 2014). Many 
argue in favor of stricter, top-down oversight because poor decision-making can be 
hazardous to national fiscal finances and the macroeconomy (Canuto and Liu 2010, 
Leigland 1997, Cecchetti et al 2010, Cernuschi and Platz 2006). Others argue that a bottom-
up approach ± allowing greater subnational autonomy in public investment, fiscal finances, 
and debt policy decisions ± can encourage local innovation (Tabellini and Alesina 1990, 
Alesina et al 1996; Poterba and von Hagen 1999). These scholars argue that political 
competition between parties for votes and market competition between subnational 
governments for voters will rein the incentive to make inefficient policy choices. 
Most scholars debating the merits of these top-down and bottom-up approaches for 
regulating subnational capital markets say that the ultimate configuration of either functional 
framework should depend on the structural economic, fiscal, and political factors already 
known to shape underlying policy efficiency (Ter-Minassian 1997). However, research 
suggests that several additional functional factors may also matter for subnational debt. For 
example, local governments that lie within larger metropolitan areas may cooperate to 
provide higher quality and more efficient public services (De Mello 2000, Feiock 2004, 
Cernuschi and Platz 2006, Miller and Cox 2015). This suggests that metropolitan 
municipalities may also be pushed to assume greater debt loads but also to take more 
efficient debt policy decisions. Research has also shown that greater administrative capacity 
raises the quantity and quality of public service provision, especially in urban areas 
(Campbell 2003, Tulchin, and Selee 2004, Avellaneda 2009). This suggests that localities 
benefiting from well-trained administrators will take out greater debt loads to provide better 
public works but will also make more efficient debt policy decisions as well. 
 3 
Despite the possibility that functional factors like metropolitan area cooperation and 
administrative capacity may affect debt policy choices, there is little research examining 
whether this is the case. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining whether metropolitan 
area cooperation and subnational administrative capacity affect subnational debt policy 
choices. Building on the research noted above, we hypothesize that municipal governments 
forming part of larger metropolitan areas that are driven toward greater service provision 
will also be pushed to assume greater debt loads but also to make more efficient debt policy 
decisions and access more sophisticated, lower cost instruments. We also hypothesize that 
municipalities with greater administrative capacity will not only seek to provide greater 
public services, they will also be encouraged to contract greater debt loads to pay for them 
but lean toward more sophisticated, cost-efficient debt as well. 
To examine empirical support for these hypotheses, we examine a country where 
subnational debt policy rights are relatively new: Mexico. The structural economic 
(economic cycles), fiscal (vertical fiscal imbalances and soft budget constraints), and 
political (vertical partisan juxtaposition) structural factors leading Mexico¶s states and 
municipalities to fiscal excess and excess debt are known (e.g., Cabrero and Carrera 2002, 
Giugale, et al 2000, Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2008). However, little research 
has been conducted on whether and how other functional factors might also matter for the 
debt policy choices. Although per capita subnational debt levels in Mexico are still low by 
international standards (about 3.0% GDP in 2014), total subnational debt in Mexico has 
risen three-fold in just 10 years, from going from about 1,000 pesos per capita in 2004 to 
about 4,300 pesos in 2014 (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Pública (SHCP).  
To undertake this study, we construct an original panel dataset of yearly municipal 
level loans, including total loans and loans by type of instrument, to examine the impact of 
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metropolitan cooperation and administrative capacity on debt policy in municipal Mexico. 
Cross-sectional time-series analysis shows that, contrary to expectations, administrative 
capacity tends to have no effect on municipal debt policy choices, something that we 
attribute to a lack of municipal financial expertise and to the presence of external financial 
advising services. In line with expectations, metropolitan areas cooperate to avoid the most 
costly types of loans but, contrary to expectations, they do not access the cheapest financial 
instruments at higher rates than non-metropolitan places, something we attribute to the 
presence of federal funds earmarked for metropolitan projects. These findings suggest that 
national governments may use fiscal incentives to encourage metropolitan cooperation, 
especially to raise the cost-efficiency of subnational debt decisions.  
 
Mexico¶s Subnational Capital Market 
Mexico¶s federal s\stem is structured around 31 states and a Federal District, with 
states divided into about 2,443 municipalities, depending on the year. Mexico is known for 
its longtime dominant party system run by the mass-based Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) throughout most of the 20th century until 2000. That year, the right-leaning National 
Action Party (PAN) defeated the PRI in the race for the presidenc\, heralding the nation¶s 
democratic transition. The subsequent 2006 presidential election pitted the PAN against the 
left-leaning Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), a PRI splinter party that had challenged 
the PRI in the 1988 presidential race and lost. PAN candidate Felipe Calderon won in 2006, 
with the formerly dominant PRI finishing third. In 2012, however, the PRI defeated both the 
PAN and the PRD in a highly competitive presidential race.  
Since 2001 ± and a series of fiscal and bank reforms that begun in 1997 ± Mexico¶s 
state and municipal governments have been allowed to contract debt from public and private 
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sources for capital investments (Auditoria Superior de la Federación 2011, Revilla 2013, 
Villa 2009). Instead of designing a system of top-down oversight over the nation¶s 
subnational capital market, the national government sought to rely on bottom-up political 
and market competition to manage debt policy decisions (Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-
Rabling 2008). National laws governing subnational debt rights are limited in scope and 
merely specify that no subnational government may contract debt in foreign currency, that 
all long-term debt must be registered with the national finance ministry, and that all debt 
must be used for economically productive purposes, although this last provision is rarely 
enforced. Bank capitalization requirements require all lenders to pay attention to the 
creditworthiness of their clients. State and municipal governments seeking private sector 
financing must contract rating agencies to appraise their fiscal positions and operations. 
Those seeking development bank loans usually need only submit an assessment of their 
fiscal solvency by this lender. 
States have the right to constrain state and municipal debt loads by placing formal 
limits on the amount of debt assumed²according to a percent share of fiscal revenues or a 
delimited upper ceiling (Auditoria Superior de la Federación 2011, Revilla 2013). States can 
also determine the process for contracting debt. When established, the process for 
authorizing municipal debt usually requires that municipalities gain a two-thirds majority 
approval in their municipal councils for debt plans, and that municipalities and states receive 
state legislative approval for the loans being sought. Even so, state regulatory frameworks 
appear to provide little in the way of de facto budget restrictions. Municipal council and/or 
state legislative approval is relatively easy to get, as governors and mayors dominate their 
legislative branches, while municipal councilors and state legislators ask few questions 
about planned public investments or loan financing terms. This has allowed subnational 
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governments to access capital markets with little oversight, resulting in sometimes large and 
costly debt portfolios.  
The debt instruments available to subnational governments in Mexico include public 
development bank loans, loans accessed through ³trust  ´ instruments, private commercial 
bank loans, and municipal bonds placed in the Mexican stock market (Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público 2005). The most expensive financial instruments available to 
subnational governments include development bank loans and private sector loans 
administered through legally constituted ³trusts.  ´ The mission of the nation¶s development 
banks is not to provide subsidized credit but, instead, to facilitate public works that might be 
considered unprofitable from the perspective of private sector lenders and to facilitate the 
extension of public services to places considered high credit risks. As such, subnational 
governments undertaking unprofitable but necessary public works or deemed high credit 
risks should tend to rely on public development bank loans, even though these loans may 
include additional overhead costs for administrative and technical assistance (Giugale 2003).  
Similarly, trust instruments were designed to allow the nation¶s less creditworthy 
subnational entities access to private capital at reasonable rates. However, they also provide 
a vehicle for inter-municipal or inter-state cooperation or public-private partnerships on 
public works. The creation of a ³trust  ´ administered b\ a third part\ financial institution 
legally binds the subnational government(s) to dedicate a set revenue stream for a specified 
period of time to guarantee that the total resources available in it never dip below an 
established level. Those revenue streams most often dedicated by subnational governments 
usually constitute unearmarked fiscal transfers, but they may also dedicate own source 
revenues from service fees or property taxes. (In general, Mexico¶s national government 
enjoys most tax rights, with states receiving most resources through federal fiscal transfers 
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and municipalities through state transfers. States and municipalities retain some tax rights 
but they take advantage of this to different degrees.) The trust provides an additional 
guarantee to creditors, as any violation of its terms would constitute a breach of contract. 
Yet, the creation of the trust requires an additional layer of administrative costs and fees, on 
top of the baseline costs of any private sector financial instruments used to asses them. Trust 
instrument loans thus rank alongside development bank debt in their cost to borrowers.  
Commercial bank loans and bonds are, relatively speaking, more cost-efficient forms 
of financing. Municipalities with relatively better credit ratings should prefer commercial 
bank loans and bond emissions over development bank debt and trusts. While commercial 
bank loans are generally used for projects requiring short and medium-term financing (with 
loan durations fewer than seven years), bond emissions are used to secure longer-term 
financing (loan durations more than seven years). Often commercial bank loans are 
refinanced into longer bond emissions. States and municipalities receive better terms for 
these private financing instruments if they secure multiple credit ratings from ratings 
agencies and if they offer repayment guarantees using federal fiscal transfers or own-source 
revenues. Commercial banks peg interest rates to the nation¶s interbank lending rate, but add 
points to reflect the borrower¶s credit rating. Additional costs include legal fees to set up the 
contract, internal assessments and other administrative costs. Those subnational 
governments directly accessing commercial bank loans usually guarantee them with fiscal 
transfers or own source revenue streams, although they do not take the additional step of 
creating a legally constituted trust.  
The cheapest private financial instrument available is accessed through a bond 
emission. Bond emissions are organized by private financial institutions that agree alone or 
in syndicate with others to underwrite the full emission and remarket it to investors in 
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Mexico¶s local stock market. Successful bond emissions require strong credit ratings, as the 
risks of nonpayment are pushed to investors. Although there are fees and other costs 
associated with a bond emission, this instrument is cost-efficient because it allows 
subnational governments immediate liquidity and it reaches a wider range of national 
lenders (investors) compared to those accessing loans through development banks or trusts. 
If political competition and market forces were at work guiding subnational debt 
dynamics in Mexico, as was originally intended, then we should expect to see municipalities 
with similar credit ratings constructing similar debt portfolios. Yet, a glance at several 
municipalities with over one million inhabitants each and strong (investment grade) credit 
ratings (over mxA in 2012, Standard & Poor¶s 2013) shows surprising debt portfolio 
variation. In the state of Nuevo Leyn, highl\ indebted Monterre\¶s (mxAA) $1,858 pesos 
per capita total debt in 2012 was divided almost evenly between commercial banks ($867) 
and national development banks ($991). In contrast, in the state of Jalisco, highly indebted 
Guadalajara¶s (mxA) $1,777 pesos per capita debt in 2012 was owed almost entirel\ to 
commercial banks. Meanwhile, relatively less indebted León (mxAA) in the state of 
Guanajuato had most of its total debt load of $683 pesos per capita with commercial banks 
($478 per capita) and the rest with development banks ($205 per capita). In contrast, 
similarly indebted Puebla city (mxA+) in the state of Puebla used commercial banks to 
finance its $481 pesos per capita debt. Why would similarly creditworthy cities show such 
different totals and types of debt in their debt portfolios? 
We examine the impact of two functional factors ± metropolitan cooperation and 
administrative capacity ± on subnational debt policy choices, controlling for other 
(structural) factors that might also affect these decisions. Building on research arguing that 
municipalities cooperate within metropolitan areas to provide greater and more efficient 
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public services (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren 1961, Miller 1981, De Mello 2000, Feiock 2004, 
Cernuschi and Platz 2006, Miller and Cox 2015) and that larger loan packages provide 
greater economies of scale (Freire and Petersen 2004, Canuto and Liu 2010), we hypothesize 
that metropolitan areas should assume greater debt loads but also use more efficient debt 
instruments like commercial bank loans and bond emissions to this end. Any findings that 
this is not the case would suggest that research showing that metropolitan areas in Mexico 
do not cooperate as much as one might expect on public works (Ramírez de la Cruz 2012, 
Iracheta and Iracheta 2014) also extends to cooperating on financing as well.  
We also hypothesize that subnational governments with greater administrative 
capacity should enjoy greater access to subnational capital markets, thereby assuming 
greater debt loads as a result, but also that they will be attracted to more sophisticated, cost-
efficient financing instruments like commercial bank loans and bonds emissions. 
Subnational governments in developing countries frequently count on lower human capital 
from which to staff their administrations, undermining the quality of public administration 
and public service provision (Pillay 2008). Low human capital and low administrative 
capacity is one of the biggest handicaps for social and economic development in developing 
nations (Cabrero and Carrera 2002, Tulchin and Selee 2004, Campbell 2003). We thus 
expect that lower administrative capacity will lower the capacity of subnational governments 
to access subnational capital markets, leaving them more likely to take out less sophisticated 
development bank loans or to establish third-party trusts to administer their loans. In 
contrast, greater administrative capacity will raise subnational governmental capacity to 
access subnational capital markets and more sophisticated and cost-efficient instruments. 
Any findings that administrative capacity had no effect on debt policy choices would 
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suggest either that it does not extend to local financial expertise, or that local governments 
are abdicating financial decisions to external financial advisors, or both. 
 
The Panel Dataset 
To examine whether metropolitan cooperation and administrative capacity affect 
subnational borrowing, we construct a panel dataset including Mexico¶s 2,443 
municipalities across eight consecutive years, producing a total of 19,544 municipal-year 
observations. Our dataset begins in 2005, the first \ear the nation¶s finance ministr\ began 
to record subnational debt data, and ends in 2012, the last year for which we have complete 
data. Our database includes municipalities in all 31 states but not the nation¶s Federal 
District whose lower-level ³delegations  ´ do not enjoy the same debt rights as municipalities. 
The dependent variables include the yearly amount borrowed by municipal 
governments by total and by type of instrument, that is, whether through development bank 
loans, loans administered through ³trust  ´ instruments, commercial bank loans, and bond 
emissions. We transform yearly municipal peso-denominated loan amounts into per capita 
figures and take the square root to account for outliers and nonlinearity. (The standard 
logarithmic transformation is not possible due to the presence of frequent yearly zero 
municipal debt acquisition.) We include zero yearly municipal loan amounts to account for 
the full range of debt policy choices available to municipal governments.  
As shown in Table 1, development bank debt averaged 51.84 pesos per capita during 
the 2005-2012 period we examine, compared to commercial bank debt which averaged 
23.30 pesos per capita, bond emissions which averaged 5.79 pesos per capita, and trust 
instrument debt which averaged 0.50 pesos per capita. These figures represent averages 
across all observations, including those with zero loan amounts. The peso-per-capita figures 
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are in 2005 pesos, when the exchange rate averaged 10.89 Mexican pesos per US dollar. As 
shown in Table 2, 1,342 or 54.93 percent of municipalities accessed some kind of debt 
instrument during the 2005-2012 period, while 1,098 or 44.94 percent assumed no loans. 
Most municipalities taking out loans (72.65 percent) prioritized one type of instrument over 
others. Only 18 out of the 1,342 municipalities, that is only 1.34 percent, of these taking out 
loans accessed the three main debt instruments available to them (development bank, 
commercial bank, and bond debt) (Group 1), although 193 accessed development bank and 
commercial bank loans (Group 2), and 154 development bank loans and bonds (Group 3).  
±Table 1 and 2 About Here± 
The main explanatory variables include two different measures for metropolitan 
cooperation and a proxy for municipal administrative capacity. The metropolitan measures 
include whether the municipality was designated by the national government as lying within 
a metropolitan area and whether the municipality was a signatory to a metropolitan area plan 
or program. Data from the national population council, or Consejo Nacional de Población 
(CONAPO), are updated every five years with the national census. In 2010, 14 percent of 
the municipal-year observations ± or 351 municipalities ± were recognized as lying within a 
metropolitan area and 274 of these were identified as having a formal metropolitan 
cooperation plans/programs in place. 
To capture the level of municipal administrative capacity we use a municipal 
development index ± CONAPO¶s marginalit\ index ± with higher values indicating lower 
human capital and thus lower administrative capacity. Development indices reflect the 
quality of human capital available from which elected and appointed municipal officials are 
selected. Table 1 presents summary statistics. We use a human capital-based measure for 
two reasons. First, scholars facing similar data limitations, with data on administrative 
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educational levels or administrative efficiency, have also highlighted the usefulness of this 
approach for capturing administrative capacity (e.g., O¶Toole and Meier 1999, Avellaneda 
2009, Meza 2015). Second, although some mayors in Mexico might seek to expand the pool 
from which appointments are made outside municipal borders, studies show that most make 
appointments from within their localities are based on political criteria, appointing loyal 
campaign workers and supporters that helped them achieve office (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 2013). Indeed, for this reason, measures such as 
municipal public employment are unacceptable as a proxy for administrative capacity: 
municipal public employment most likely reflects political patronage levels rather than 
administrative capacity (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013).  
The panel dataset also includes a series of demographic and fiscal controls. More 
populous and urban municipalities tend to find it easier to access subnational capital markets 
(Thau 2011, Freire and Petersen 2004, Freire 2014), so we include total population (square 
root) and the share population living in rural areas (with fewer than 2,500 habitants), both 
from the national geographic and statistics institute INEGI. Wealthier municipalities also 
tend to enjoy greater borrowing capacity (Thau 2011, Freire and Petersen 2004, Freire 
2014), so we also include a control for total fiscal assets (own source and transfer revenues, 
per capita square root) from INEGI. Municipalities less dependent on fiscal transfers may 
enjoy greater access to capital (Thau 2011, Freire and Petersen 2004, Freire 2014) (data 
from INEGI). Crime rates may affect lender perceptions of governmental stability, so we 
include the homicide rate (murders per 100,000 people) (from INEGI). These indicators 
affect access to capital markets indirectly though their effect on credit ratings and directly 
through their effect on lenders¶ perceptions about the capacity to repay. We use these 
variables instead of municipal credit ratings because this would lead municipalities choosing 
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zero debt liabilities or only accessing development bank debt to drop out of the sample; as 
mentioned above, only those municipalities accessing private sector credits need to secure 
credit ratings in Mexico. See Table 1 for summary statistics. 
Finally, we include important political controls. Municipal debt may be affected by 
electoral and partisan policy cycles (Drazen and Eslava 2010, Jones, Meloni, and Tommasi 
2012, Sáez 2016), so we include municipal election year and partisan dummies. Vertical 
partisan alignment may encourage fiscal discipline (Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000, 
Rodden and Wibbels 2002), with a dummy variable capturing whether mayors were 
copartisan with state governors. Data are from state electoral institutes and a development 
research think tank CIDAC. See Table 1 for summary statistics for these variables as well. 
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
We examine the data using linear Prais-Winston cross-sectional time-series analysis 
with panel-corrected standard errors (CSTS-PCSE). We chose CSTS-PSCE for two reasons. 
First, modified Wald tests for group-wise (here, municipal) heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals showed that we could reject the null hypothesis (p<0.01) of homoskedastic errors 
for all of our dependent variables. Second, Wooldridge tests for serial autocorrelation (order 
1) in the residuals showed that we can reject the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation 
(p<0.01), even with the inclusion of lagged dependent variables in the models. CSTS-PCSE 
can correct for both heteroskedastic and autoregressive error processes (we use an AR(1) 
correction). (We did not correct for cross-panel contemporaneous correlation or panel-
specific autoregressive processes due to missing data and the short time series.) We run all 
models on the data in level form: unit-root tests ± specifically, Levin-Lin-Chu, Harris-
Tzavalis, and Breitung tests ± which show that we can reject the null hypothesis of the 
 14 
presence of unit roots (p < 0.01) and thus conclude that each dependent variable is 
stationary. We include a lagged dependent variable (per capita, square root) in all models, to 
account for observed autocorrelation in the residuals (in models without lags) and to control 
for any substantive effect of prior debt on subsequent debt. We also include the lag of total 
debt in all models (per capita, square root), in case that this affects access to capital markets.  
The CSTS-PCSE model¶s panel (municipal) correction of the standard errors 
precludes the need for panel (municipal) fixed effects. Even so, the inclusion of municipal 
fixed effects would not be statistically appropriate given our data. The main explanatory 
variables ± metropolitan area and the marginality index ± as well as several of the controls ± 
like the political ones ± are either time-invariant or very sluggish over time. The main 
explanatory variables are coded only once every five years (in 2005 and 2010), with the only 
point of possible variation in our sample occurring with the 2010 recoding, which rarely 
occurs. It is precisely time-invariant nature or sluggishness of our main explanatory 
variables ± as well as some political ones ± across a sizeable number of municipalities that 
requires an approach prioritizes inter-municipal comparisons (a random-effects approach) 
rather than intra-municipal ones (a fixed-effects approach). The superiority of the random- 
over fixed-effects approach under such conditions is explained by Clark and Linzer (2015). 
Even so, we include higher- level state and year fixed effects. State fixed effects 
(dummy variables) account for a variety of state level factors that might influence municipal 
debt decisions, including the health of state governmental fiscal finances or any state level 
regulations (though usually unenforced) affecting municipal debt loads. Year fixed effects 
(dummies) control for the impact of aggregate time-series trends common to all 
municipalities, such as changes in the central bank¶s \early average benchmark inter-bank 
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lending interest rate, that can affect debt dynamics; tests for whether year dummy were 
jointly equal to zero allowed us to reject the null hypothesis that they were (p<0.01). 
Table 3 and Table 5 present results using the measure for whether a metropolitan 
municipality was designated as part of a metropolitan area. Table 4 and Table 6 present 
results using the measure for whether a metropolitan municipality was a signatory to a 
formal metropolitan area plan/program. Table 3 and Table 4 present results for models 
including all municipalities, using state election results to calculate municipal partisan 
control and election margins in Oaxaca. Most municipalities in Oaxaca do not hold party-
based elections. Table 5 and Table 6 present results for models excluding the state of 
Oaxaca¶s 570 municipalities. As shown below, the results are the same. 
We begin the discussion of the statistical results with the impact of municipal 
administrative capacity on the different types of debt. We originally expected that greater 
administrative capacity (low values on the marginality index) would push municipalities to 
access more cost-efficient financing instruments, including commercial bank loans and 
bonds, and that it would steer them away from more cost-inefficient development bank loans 
and trusts. In line with expectations, the coefficient for the marginality index was positive 
and significant for the trust instrument models (Model 3) in Table 3 and Table 4 (and Table 
5 and Table 6 without Oaxaca), with lower human development (high values on the 
marginality index) associated with greater trust debt, in line with expectations. In other 
words, a one point improvement in municipal administrative capacity (a one point decline in 
the marginality index, which ranges from -2.27 to +4.40 in our dataset), would lead to a 
0.019 decline in the square root of peso per capita debt contracted through trusts or a 
0.000361 pesos per capita total decline, a minimal effect. Contrary to expectations, however, 
the marginality index did not have a positive effect on development bank debt. Also contrary 
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to our expectations, administrative capacity did not have a negative and significant effect on 
commercial bank or bond debt, with its coefficients insignificant in these models (Model 2, 
Model 4, Model 5) in Table 3 and Table 4 (and Table 5 and Table 6 without Oaxaca). The 
variable¶s negative and significant coefficient in the commercial bank model in Table 3 
(Model 4) is not robust to other specifications in other tables. 
±Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 About Here± 
The lack of effect of administrative capacity on total, development bank, commercial 
bank, and bond debt, and its minimal impact on trusts, suggests that one of two things is at 
work. Either greater administrative capacity is not equivalent to greater financial expertise or 
municipalities with lower administrative capacity hire external financial advisors to help 
them overcome their administrative deficits (as in the US, see Miller 1993 and Simonsen et 
al. 2001). Either way, municipal governments appear to lack financial expertise, something 
that makes them dependent on external financial advisors whose incentives structures may 
differ from those of municipal governments (Marlow 2013, Luby and Moldogaziev 2013, 
Luby 2014). In Mexico, there is some evidence to suggest that municipalities hire financial 
advisors based on their partisan preferences (Benton and Smith 2013), with these financial 
advisors enjoying close ties to specific financial institutions that push specific types of loans 
(Benton and Smith 2013). The political control variables demonstrate that municipalities 
tend to concentrate loans in off-election years, when public works would occur if they were 
to maximize their electoral impact, and that parties often display preferences for certain 
types of loans (as shown by the sometimes statistically significant coefficients on the 
partisan variables), suggests that this may be the case. 
We also expected that municipalities in metropolitan areas would access subnational 
capital markets at greater rates but would prefer to coordinate around more cost-efficient 
 17 
financial instruments like commercial bank loans and bonds rather than around development 
bank loans and trusts. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, municipalities designated as 
metropolitan (Table 3) and those with formal metropolitan plans in place (Table 4) enjoyed 
lower development bank debt compared to non-metropolitan municipalities, as expected. 
These variables were both negative and significant in the development bank debt models 
(Model 2) in these tables, with these findings robust to the exclusion of Oaxaca in Table 5 
and Table 6. Likewise, the variable for metropolitan area was negative and significant for 
trust instrument debt (Model 3), in line with expectations, although the variable capturing 
the presence of a formal municipal plan/program was not significant in the trust debt 
models. This suggests that metropolitan municipalities tend to avoid costlier lending through 
development bank loans and trusts, although the presence of a formal municipal plans plays 
no role in trusts; rather, being part of a metropolitan area matters more. Models excluding 
Oaxaca reproduced these findings (Table 5 and Table 6). Substantively speaking, municipal 
designation as belonging to a metropolitan area lowered development bank debt per capita 
by 0.384 pesos per capita (square root) or by 0.147 pesos per capita. In an average-sized city 
with 40,136 residents, this amounts 5,000 pesos less in development bank debt in any single 
year or 50,000 pesos less over 10 years. In a larger municipality, say with 10 times the 
population or 400,000 people, this amounts to 58,000 pesos less development bank debt in 
any year and 580,000 pesos less debt over 10 years, a figure that can start to add up, 
especially in municipalities with limited budgets. 
Contrary to our expectations, however, neither of the two metropolitan indicators 
affected commercial bank loans (Model 4) or bond emissions (Model 5), with the 
coefficients for these variables insignificant in all tables. This suggests that metropolitan 
municipalities do not cooperate to access the cheapest debt available to them in subnational 
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capital markets, even if they do cooperate to avoid costlier forms of financing. The reason 
why this may be the case lies with the presence of federal metropolitan funds earmarked for 
common public works (Iracheta and Iracheta 2014). Officially designated metropolitan areas 
can apply for federal funds for shared public works, regardless of whether a municipal plan 
is in place, lowering their private sector debt requirements and, it appears, bringing them in 
line with those of non-metropolitan areas. In other words, the national government¶s 
metropolitan fund appears to be helping metropolitan municipalities address their greater 
public service demands, helping them avoid assuming greater debt loads. 
With these findings in mind, the results for total debt make sense. Given that lack of 
impact of administrative capacity on all types of loans, and its minimal impact on trusts, it is 
not surprising that this functional factor played no role in total loan acquisition. Similarly, 
the metropolitan indicators were negative and significant in all total debt models in all 
tables, a finding driven by their negative impact on development bank loans and trust debt. 
Substantively, metropolitan areas enjoyed 0.395 less peso per capita (square root) debt, or 
0.156 less total peso per capita debt, compared to non-metropolitan places in any year. This 
amounts to 62,000 fewer pesos owed in any year in a municipality with 400,000 residents or 
620,000 pesos for this same municipality over 10 years. Returning to the point above, 
metropolitan municipalities thus need not assume greater debt loads compared to non-
metropolitan places in order to meet greater public services demands. Instead, they turn 
federal fiscal funds, keeping their preferred private sector debt loads in line with other, non-
metropolitan municipalities. 
We conclude the statistical analysis with discussion of the controls, beginning with 
the total debt models (Model 1) in Table 3. More populous municipalities assumed greater 
per capita debt, but more urban (less rural) municipalities did not. This supports our 
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expectation that more populous places, and not necessarily more urban, with greater tax 
bases enjoy greater access to capital markets (e.g., Freire 2014). The impact of vertical fiscal 
imbalances was negative and significant, in line with our expectation that this would hamper 
access to capital markets as well (e.g., Freire 2014). However, greater total fiscal assets per 
capita, a measure of municipal fiscal wealth, did not facilitate access to debt, in line with 
findings in other research (e.g., Espinosa and Martell 2015). Instead of fiscal solvency, the 
size of the municipal tax base appears to be more import in Mexico. Homicide raised total 
debt figures, through its impact on development bank loans. Vertical partisan alignment had 
no effect on total debt loads, contrary to other research (e.g., Jones, Sanguinetti, and 
Tommasi 2000, Rodden and Wibbels 2002). The municipal election year dummy was 
negative and significant, showing that total debt loads increased in off-election years, 
consistent with observations about the multi-year nature of public works projects beginning 
well ahead of elections in order to deliver municipal incumbents political rewards. Less 
popular governments (lower margins of victory) also tended to spend more. 
Assuming that the si]e of the municipal tax base raises private sector lenders¶ 
expectations about the capacity to repay (e.g., Freire 2014), we might expect to find a 
positive relationship between population size and commercial bank loans and bonds but a 
negative relationship with trusts and development bank loans. As shown in Table 3, 
municipal population had a positive and significant effect on commercial (Model 4) bank 
debt but no effect on bonds (Model 5). It had a positive and significant effect on 
development bank debt (Model 2) but not effect on trusts (Model 3). That larger 
municipalities did not enjoy greater access to bond markets and smaller municipalities were 
not directed toward trusts is not that surprising, considering that financial advisors may be 
helping small municipalities set up bond emissions and that trusts are used by both the small 
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places that would otherwise be denied access to private sector loans but also to larger 
municipalities engaging in inter-municipal projects or public-private partnerships. That 
larger municipalities enjoyed greater development bank loans suggests that these banks are 
not lending according to their stated mission, which is in part to foment public works in 
smaller localities. This suspicion is reinforced by the rural population variable¶s negative 
and significant coefficient for development bank loans. 
The variable measuring the impact of total fiscal assets on debt was not significant 
across the debt type models, except trusts, in line with research showing that debt in Mexico 
is rarely allocated according to such criteria (e.g., Espinosa and Martell 2015). Vertical 
fiscal imbalances had no effect on commercial bank and bond debt, but a negative effect on 
development bank loans and trusts, a surprising set of findings because we would have 
expected the reverse. We were not surprised by the commercial bank loans and bond 
findings, given the presence of loan guarantees attached to these instruments. However, we 
were surprised to find that development bank loans and trust appear directed to places with 
lower dependence on fiscal transfers, rather than the reverse, something that requires future 
study. Homicide rates raised access to development bank debt but lowered access to 
commercial bank loans. We were not surprised to find that development bank debt is 
targeted toward high crime rate places, or that trusts were unaffected by crime, or that 
commercial banks were negatively affected. What was surprising was that homicide rates 
have no impact on bond emissions, meriting future study as well. 
 
Conclusion  
The original aim of this study was to examine whether two functional factors often 
associated with better and more efficient public policy and public works ± metropolitan 
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cooperation and administrative capacity ± might also matter for the debt decisions used to 
finance them. Scholars and policy experts have tended to focus on the structural ± economic, 
fiscal, and political factors ± that drive subnational governments toward inefficient policy 
decisions (type II problems), and thus toward excessive and costly debt, leading national 
governments to consider these issues when designing subnational fiscal and debt policy 
frameworks (Ter-Minassian 1997, Rodden 2006). In contrast, we seek to show that 
functional factors like metropolitan cooperation and administrative capacity can also affect 
debt policy decisions as well, something that should encourage governments to consider 
these things when designing debt policy frameworks as well.  
To make this point, we examined a case where these functional factors should play 
the greatest role, a case where subnational capital markets are new and under-developed: 
Mexico. Cross-sectional time-series analysis of a panel dataset of yearly municipal loan 
amounts by total and type revealed some expected and some surprising results. We find that 
municipalities located in metropolitan areas appear to cooperate to avoid costly debt 
financing like development bank loans and loans administered through third-party trusts, 
although they do not appear to cooperate to access more cost-efficient debt like commercial 
bank loans or bonds. We attribute this last finding to the presence of earmarked federal 
funds for joint metropolitan projects, which appear to encourage metropolitan cooperation in 
project planning and administration, but only nominally in financing decisions. If 
metropolitan municipalities had not cooperated at all on financing, then they would have met 
greater public service demands through greater total debt, which was not the case.  
We also find that Mexican municipalities did not leverage greater administrative 
capacity into greater access to subnational capital markets or more cost-efficient debt. It 
appears that greater administrative capacity may not always translate into greater financial 
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expertise, with the fiscal solvency of public projects perhaps mattering more for financing 
terms (Espinosa and Martell 2015).  However, evidence suggests that subnational 
governments in Mexico rely on the services of contracted external financial advisors. This is 
certainly the case in the US, where collusion among financial advisors has sometimes 
resulted in hidden loan fees and questionable financing choices as advisors push cities 
toward those debt instruments available through their preferred lenders (Miller 1993, Luby 
and Moldogaziev 2013).   
The study reveals important policy lessons for Mexico and other nations using 
subnational capital markets to finance public works.  National policy programs that raise the 
incentive for metropolitan or intra-regional cooperation on joint public works can encourage 
cooperation on project financing as well.  This is particularly important in nations suffering 
from low administrative capacity or from overreliance on external financial advisors.  
Although governments may also improve subnational administrative capacity and to regulate 
external financial advisors, subnational debt policy efficiency can also be achieved through 
metropolitan or intra-regional public policy cooperation.  Joint public works produce 
economies of scale for project development and administration, as well as for project 
finance, reducing aggregate financing requirements and costs, and thus the fiscal impact of 
low administrative capacity or opportunistic financial advisors.  National governments 
hoping to improve efficiency in subnational debt decisions should thus seek to foment 
metropolitan area policy cooperation ± such as by providing funds for joint projects, as in 
Mexico ± or metropolitan area administrative structures ± such as by requiring metropolitan 
area administrative plans, as in South Korea or Japan ± to encourage inter-city cooperation 
on public policy and works.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (2005-2012) 
      
Dependent Variables      
All Observations Total Obs.* Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Debt Per Capita 19,515 83.86 1,317.79 0.00 133,887.20 
Development Bank Debt PC 19,515 51.84 143.95 0.00 2,645.73 
Commercial Bank Debt PC 19,515 25.30 1,307.79 0.00 133,887.20 
Bond Debt Per Capita 19,515 5.79 63.25 0.00 6,714.76 
Trust Debt Per Capita 19,515 0.50 22.21 0.00 1,690.86 
      
Observations with Debt Obs. Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Debt Per Capita 5,594 292.56 2,449.05 1.62E-15 133,887.20 
Development Bank Debt PC 4,700 215.23 225.57 1.62E-15 2,645.73 
Commercial Bank Debt PC 803 614.78 6,422.76 8.93E-01 133,887.20 
Bond Debt Per Capita 802 140.96 280.00 5.17E+00 6,714.76 
Trust Debt Per Capita 149 65.70 246.45 2.27E-08 1,690.86 
      
Independent Variables      
 Total Obs.* Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Marginality Index 19510 0.01 0.99 -2.27 4.50 
      
 Total Obs. Yes Share "Yes" No Share "No" 
Lying within Metro Area 19,544 2,808 0.14 16,736 0.86 
Metro Plan/Program 19,544 2,192 0.11 17,352 0.89 
      
 Munis. Yes Share "Yes" No Share "No" 
Lying within Metro Area 2010 2,443 351 0.14 2,089 0.86 
Metro Plan/Program 2010 2,443 274 0.11 2,166 0.89 
      
 Total Obs.* Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Homicide Rate 19,515 16.43 46.97 0.00 2,270.95 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance  16,982 0.85 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Total Fiscal Assets Per Capita 16,979 2,668.18 1,674.90 123.56 27,703.08 
Total Population 19,515 40,136 118,134 93 1,688,258 
Rural Population Share 19,510 0.61 0.36 0.00 1.00 
      
 Total Obs. Yes Share "Yes" No Share "No" 
Election Year 19,544 5,873 0.30 13,671 0.70 
Aligned with State Governor 19,544 9,377 0.48 10,167 0.52 
PRI Municipalities 19,544 10,726 0.55 8,818 0.45 
PAN Municipalities 19,544 3,720 0.19 15,824 0.81 
PRD Municipalities 19,544 2,255 0.12 17,289 0.88 
PAN-PRD Municipalities 19,544 1,877 0.10 17,667 0.90 
"Other" Party Municipalities 19,544 939 0.05 18,605 0.95 
Note: * Does not total 19,544 due to missing data. 
 
Table 2: Types of Debt in Municipal Debt Portfolios (2005-2012) 
 Main Types of Debt Minor Types of Debt Municipalities 
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Dev. Bank 
Debt 
Com. Bank 
Debt 
Bond 
Debt 
Trust 
Debt 
"Other" 
Debt Number 
Percent 
Total 
Group 1 Yes Yes Yes No No 11 0.45 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 0.16 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3 0.12 
 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 0 0.00 
      18 0.74% 
Group 2 Yes Yes No No No 168 6.88 
 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 4 0.16 
 Yes Yes No Yes No 12 0.49 
 Yes Yes No No Yes 9 0.37 
      193 7.90% 
Group 3 Yes No Yes No No 102 4.18 
 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 1 0.04 
 Yes No Yes Yes No 51 2.09 
 Yes No Yes No Yes 0 0.00 
      154 6.30% 
Group 4 No Yes Yes No No 0 0.00 
 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 0.00 
 No Yes Yes Yes No 0 0.00 
 No Yes Yes No Yes 0 0.00 
      0 0.00% 
Group 5 Yes No No No No 821 33.61 
 Yes No No Yes Yes 1 0.04 
 Yes No No Yes No 42 1.72 
 Yes No No No Yes 6 0.25 
      870 35.61% 
Group 6 No Yes No No No 65 2.66 
 No Yes No Yes Yes 0 0.00 
 No Yes No Yes No 0 0.00 
 No Yes No No Yes 1 0.04 
      66 2.70% 
Group 7 No No Yes No No 26 1.06 
 No No Yes Yes Yes 0 0.00 
 No No Yes Yes No 13 0.53 
 No No Yes No Yes 0 0.00 
      39 1.60% 
Group 8 No No No No No 1098 44.94 
 No No No Yes Yes 1 0.04 
 No No No No Yes 1 0.04 
 No No No Yes No 0 0.00 
      1,100 45.03% 
Municipalities with Debt (Summary Statistics) 1,342 54.93% 
Municipalities with Three Main Types of Debt (Group 1) 18 1.34 
Municipalities with Two Main Types of Debt (Groups 2, 3, and 4) 347 25.86 
Municipalities with One Main Types of Debt (Groups 5, 6, and 7) 975 72.65 
Municipalities with Minor Types of Debt (See Group 8) 2 0.15 
Subtotal/Share of Municipalities with Debt 1,342 100.00 
Municipalities without Debt (Summary Statistics) (See Group 8) 1,098 44.94% 
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Municipalities with Missing Data 3 0.12% 
TOTAL MUNICIPALITIES    2,443 100.00% 
 
Table 3: Metropolitan Designation, Administrative Capacity, and Municipal Debt in Mexico 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt  Trust Debt  
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt  
Lag Total Debt 0.600*** -0.00515 0.00237*** -0.00112 0.0102*** 
 (0.110) (0.00621) (0.000852) (0.0210) (0.00379) 
Lag Dev. Bank Debt  0.728***    
  (0.0117)    
Lag Trust Debt   0.532**   
   (0.226)   
Lag Com. Bank Debt    0.194  
    (0.245)  
Lag Bond Debt     0.656*** 
     (0.0525) 
Lying in a Metro Area -0.395** -0.384*** -0.0462* 0.190 0.0266 
 (0.190) (0.134) (0.0264) (0.183) (0.0612) 
Marginality Index -0.00582 0.0285 0.0190** -0.118* -0.00679 
 (0.0777) (0.0583) (0.00829) (0.0701) (0.0282) 
Total Population  0.00638*** 0.00127*** 0.0000450 0.00962*** -0.000146 
 (0.00156) (0.000398) (0.0000858) (0.00299) (0.000180) 
Rural Population  -0.268 -0.348** -0.0532* 0.502** 0.0711 
 (0.203) (0.139) (0.0283) (0.209) (0.0604) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbal. -2.111*** -1.154*** -0.254** -0.0694 -0.0652 
 (0.575) (0.362) (0.119) (0.387) (0.131) 
Total Fiscal Assets  0.00716 -0.00126 -0.00116* 0.0116 0.000818 
 (0.00867) (0.00342) (0.000609) (0.00959) (0.00171) 
Homicide Rate 0.0295* 0.0360*** -0.000649 -0.0113* -0.00128 
 (0.0161) (0.0119) (0.00104) (0.00578) (0.00366) 
Muni. Election Year -1.545*** -1.778*** 0.000152 -0.139* 0.128*** 
 (0.139) (0.0906) (0.0145) (0.0788) (0.0198) 
Margin of Victory -0.672* -0.420* 0.0272 0.0542 -0.0935 
 (0.358) (0.229) (0.0237) (0.324) (0.0768) 
Partisan Alignment 0.0914 0.0968 -0.00464 0.0742 -0.00173 
 (0.110) (0.0930) (0.0132) (0.0652) (0.0217) 
PAN Municipality -0.0153 0.0150 -0.0198 -0.207 0.140*** 
 (0.177) (0.122) (0.0221) (0.154) (0.0354) 
PRD Municipality -0.202 -0.163 -0.0133 -0.200** 0.108*** 
 (0.142) (0.125) (0.00875) (0.0830) (0.0337) 
PAN-PRD Muni. -0.556*** -0.0774 0.0104 -0.255** -0.257*** 
 (0.186) (0.140) (0.00985) (0.101) (0.0389) 
Other Party Muni. -0.146 0.0182 -0.00255 -0.165 -0.0783* 
 (0.220) (0.187) (0.0180) (0.121) (0.0420) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.661 2.108*** 0.307** -2.507** -0.202 
 (1.115) (0.654) (0.130) (0.979) (0.313) 
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Observations 14789 14789 14789 14789 14789 
R-2 0.518 0.630 0.267 0.0874 0.585 
Chi-2 13330.5 14675.1 56.46 659.6 4516.9 
Note: Linear Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. Panels 
corrected for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (order 1) errors. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10 
 
Table 4: Metropolitan Plan, Administrative Capacity, and Municipal Debt in Mexico 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt  Trust Debt  
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt  
Lag Total Debt 0.600*** -0.00494 0.00239*** -0.000845 0.0102*** 
 (0.110) (0.00622) (0.000851) (0.0210) (0.00379) 
Lag Dev. Bank Debt  0.728***    
  (0.0117)    
Lag Trust Debt   0.542**   
   (0.225)   
Lag Com. Bank Debt    0.191  
    (0.246)  
Lag Bond Debt     0.656*** 
     (0.0525) 
Metro Area Plan -0.368* -0.450*** -0.0369 0.367 0.0224 
 (0.188) (0.135) (0.0261) (0.230) (0.0698) 
Marginality Index -0.000197 0.0271 0.0200** -0.107 -0.00735 
 (0.0773) (0.0578) (0.00837) (0.0706) (0.0284) 
Total Population  0.00636*** 0.00132*** 0.0000376 0.00953*** -0.000144 
 (0.00154) (0.000399) (0.0000850) (0.00295) (0.000176) 
Rural Population  -0.244 -0.333** -0.0493* 0.509** 0.0693 
 (0.199) (0.138) (0.0272) (0.210) (0.0611) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbal. -2.099*** -1.160*** -0.252** -0.0552 -0.0662 
 (0.572) (0.365) (0.118) (0.386) (0.130) 
Total Fiscal Assets  0.00721 -0.00119 -0.00114* 0.0114 0.000815 
 (0.00867) (0.00342) (0.000606) (0.00960) (0.00170) 
Homicide Rate 0.0297* 0.0362*** -0.000661 -0.0113** -0.00129 
 (0.0161) (0.0119) (0.00104) (0.00577) (0.00367) 
Muni. Election Year -1.544*** -1.777*** 0.000448 -0.140* 0.128*** 
 (0.139) (0.0906) (0.0146) (0.0787) (0.0198) 
Margin of Victory -0.669* -0.417* 0.0273 0.0547 -0.0937 
 (0.358) (0.229) (0.0236) (0.324) (0.0767) 
Partisan Alignment 0.0903 0.0952 -0.00437 0.0752 -0.00166 
 (0.110) (0.0930) (0.0131) (0.0652) (0.0217) 
PAN Municipality -0.0134 0.0159 -0.0196 -0.208 0.140*** 
 (0.177) (0.122) (0.0219) (0.154) (0.0354) 
PRD Municipality -0.198 -0.160 -0.0128 -0.200** 0.108*** 
 (0.142) (0.125) (0.00861) (0.0830) (0.0337) 
PAN-PRD Muni. -0.555*** -0.0764 0.0104 -0.255** -0.257*** 
 (0.186) (0.140) (0.00979) (0.101) (0.0389) 
Other Party Muni. -0.144 0.0163 -0.00218 -0.162 -0.0785* 
 (0.221) (0.187) (0.0179) (0.121) (0.0420) 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.638 2.107*** 0.302** -2.528** -0.200 
 (1.109) (0.656) (0.129) (0.982) (0.313) 
Observations 14789 14789 14789 14789 14789 
R-2 0.518 0.630 0.276 0.0861 0.585 
Chi-2 13281.4 14645.2 57.24 653.7 4523.2 
Note: Linear Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. Panels 
corrected for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (order 1) errors. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10 
 
Table 5: Metropolitan Designation, Administrative Capacity, and Municipal Debt in Mexico 
(Excluding the State of Oaxaca) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt  Trust Debt  
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt  
Lag Total Debt 0.567*** -0.00291 0.00236*** -0.000839 0.0104*** 
 (0.119) (0.00639) (0.000883) (0.0235) (0.00400) 
Lag Dev. Bank Debt  0.709***    
  (0.0124)    
Lag Trust Debt   0.537**   
   (0.226)   
Lag Com. Bank Debt    0.170  
    (0.246)  
Lag Bond Debt     0.657*** 
     (0.0531) 
Lying in a Metro Area -0.417* -0.390*** -0.0530* 0.182 0.0303 
 (0.213) (0.150) (0.0300) (0.208) (0.0659) 
Marginality Index -0.0392 0.000960 0.0347** -0.159 -0.0239 
 (0.116) (0.0839) (0.0145) (0.120) (0.0427) 
Total Population  0.00678*** 0.00127*** 0.0000147 0.0101*** -0.0000851 
 (0.00162) (0.000440) (0.0000928) (0.00308) (0.000196) 
Rural Population  -0.213 -0.307 -0.0748* 0.526* 0.0836 
 (0.277) (0.192) (0.0395) (0.300) (0.0942) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbal. -2.526*** -0.996* -0.405** -0.315 0.0925 
 (0.950) (0.525) (0.193) (0.653) (0.200) 
Total Fiscal Assets  0.0109 -0.00229 -0.00123 0.0156 0.00199 
 (0.0121) (0.00461) (0.000882) (0.0146) (0.00242) 
Homicide Rate 0.0133 0.0283* -0.000824 -0.0154* -0.00492 
 (0.0197) (0.0151) (0.00130) (0.00865) (0.00515) 
Muni. Election Year -1.557*** -1.821*** -0.00145 -0.160** 0.167*** 
 (0.140) (0.0970) (0.0147) (0.0784) (0.0262) 
Margin of Victory -0.743 -0.300 0.0324 0.0121 -0.175 
 (0.563) (0.372) (0.0386) (0.487) (0.129) 
Partisan Alignment -0.133 0.0164 -0.00262 0.0838 -0.0801** 
 (0.157) (0.125) (0.0204) (0.0976) (0.0339) 
PAN Municipality -0.204 -0.0668 -0.0188 -0.221 0.0911*** 
 (0.189) (0.139) (0.0238) (0.154) (0.0337) 
PRD Municipality -0.296* -0.235* -0.0123 -0.218** 0.107*** 
 (0.159) (0.140) (0.00985) (0.0926) (0.0372) 
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PAN-PRD Muni. -1.141*** -0.463 0.00998 -0.271* -0.387*** 
 (0.336) (0.297) (0.0183) (0.144) (0.0600) 
Other Party Muni. -0.395 -0.100 -0.00105 -0.196 -0.140*** 
 (0.246) (0.211) (0.0213) (0.135) (0.0482) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.849 2.057*** 0.466** -2.694** -0.434 
 (1.491) (0.777) (0.195) (1.274) (0.369) 
Observations 11890 11890 11890 11890 11890 
R-2 0.472 0.604 0.274 0.0752 0.587 
Chi-2 9934.9 11965.2 56.60 595.6 4683.9 
Note: Linear Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. Panels 
corrected for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (order 1) errors. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10 
 
Table 6: Metropolitan Plan/Program, Administrative Capacity, and Municipal Debt 
Dynamics in Mexico (Excluding the State of Oaxaca) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt  Trust Debt  
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt  
Lag Total Debt 0.568*** -0.00271 0.00238*** -0.000517 0.0104*** 
 (0.119) (0.00641) (0.000883) (0.0235) (0.00401) 
Lag Dev. Bank Debt  0.708***    
  (0.0124)    
Lag Trust Debt   0.544**   
   (0.225)   
Lag Com. Bank Debt    0.167  
    (0.246)  
Lag Bond Debt     0.657*** 
     (0.0531) 
Metro Area Plan -0.380* -0.456*** -0.0424 0.383 0.0245 
 (0.215) (0.154) (0.0297) (0.265) (0.0760) 
Marginality Index -0.0321 -0.000784 0.0359** -0.144 -0.0247 
 (0.116) (0.0833) (0.0146) (0.122) (0.0431) 
Total Population  0.00677*** 0.00132*** 0.00000766 0.00996*** -0.0000817 
 (0.00161) (0.000441) (0.0000923) (0.00304) (0.000192) 
Rural Population  -0.181 -0.285 -0.0697* 0.530* 0.0811 
 (0.274) (0.192) (0.0380) (0.302) (0.0954) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbal. -2.511*** -1.007* -0.401** -0.290 0.0910 
 (0.946) (0.530) (0.192) (0.650) (0.200) 
Total Fiscal Assets  0.0109 -0.00222 -0.00122 0.0153 0.00199 
 (0.0121) (0.00461) (0.000880) (0.0146) (0.00241) 
Homicide Rate 0.0134 0.0284* -0.000829 -0.0154* -0.00493 
 (0.0197) (0.0151) (0.00130) (0.00863) (0.00515) 
Muni. Election Year -1.556*** -1.820*** -0.00119 -0.161** 0.167*** 
 (0.140) (0.0969) (0.0148) (0.0783) (0.0262) 
Margin of Victory -0.735 -0.294 0.0332 0.0127 -0.175 
 (0.563) (0.372) (0.0385) (0.487) (0.128) 
Partisan Alignment -0.134 0.0146 -0.00231 0.0856 -0.0800** 
 (0.157) (0.124) (0.0203) (0.0976) (0.0339) 
 29 
PAN Municipality -0.201 -0.0657 -0.0183 -0.222 0.0908*** 
 (0.189) (0.139) (0.0236) (0.154) (0.0337) 
PRD Municipality -0.291* -0.231* -0.0117 -0.218** 0.107*** 
 (0.159) (0.140) (0.00970) (0.0926) (0.0372) 
PAN-PRD Muni. -1.139*** -0.462 0.0103 -0.269* -0.387*** 
 (0.336) (0.296) (0.0183) (0.143) (0.0600) 
Other Party Muni. -0.392 -0.101 -0.000365 -0.192 -0.141*** 
 (0.246) (0.212) (0.0212) (0.135) (0.0482) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.820 2.058*** 0.459** -2.716** -0.431 
 (1.483) (0.780) (0.193) (1.278) (0.369) 
Observations 11890 11890 11890 11890 11890 
R-2 0.471 0.604 0.280 0.0738 0.587 
Chi-2 9905.5 11934.6 57.18 588.5 4690.0 
Note: Linear Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. Panels 
corrected for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (order 1) errors. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10 
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